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Trends in Com. Media

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST
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Trends in Communist Media

~~Confidential~~

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

PEKING RELEASES SOVIET HELICOPTER CREW; MOSCOW AVOIDS COMMENT

In a surprise move with possibly broader implications for Sino-Soviet relations, Peking announced on 27 December the release of three Soviet helicopter crew members held in custody since 14 March 1974. The NCNA report of the release was carried textually in the agency's Chinese and English transmissions and broadcast widely by Peking radio to foreign as well as domestic audiences, but there has been no other mention of the issue in Chinese media.* The announcement said cryptically that Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Yu Chan had informed Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov that the helicopter and its crew were being returned since "after investigation" the Chinese public security organs "consider credible the Soviet crew members' statement about the unintentional flight into China."

The announcement is a remarkable reversal of Peking's consistent contention, proclaimed officially in a 23 March 1974 PRC Foreign Ministry statement, that a "thorough investigation" had established a "conclusive" case that the flight was part of the longstanding Soviet policy of spying against China. The 1974 statement also had rebuked Soviet authorities for trying to cover up the crime by claiming that the intrusion into China was unintentional. Since 1974 Chinese media have continued to refer to the "spy mission" from time to time. The last known reference was on 1 October 1975 when comment marking the 20th anniversary of the founding of Sinkiang Province praised the Provincial border defense units there for capturing the Soviet helicopter and its crew.

It might be conjectured that the Chinese are floating a trial balloon timed to coincide with major Soviet policy deliberations presumably now underway in connection with the CPSU Congress scheduled to begin in late February. But it should be noted that

* Thus, Peking has not acknowledged that on 30 December a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman was questioned about the release. According to the AFP correspondent in Peking, the spokesman reiterated the stand that differences of principle should not hinder normal Sino-Soviet state relations, adding that "whether relations can improve or not depends on the Soviet side."

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the Chinese gesture comes against a backdrop of intensified harsh polemics from both sides in recent months and an impasse in the Sino-Soviet border talks, first arranged during Soviet Premier Kosygin's visit to Peking in September 1969. Chief Soviet negotiator at the border talks, Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev, has been absent from Peking since last May, and this year there was an unprecedented failure to hold the annual bilateral talks dealing with navigation on the Sino-Soviet border rivers. Moreover, China's usual year-end review of the international situation went beyond charges made last year and depicted the Soviets as the main threat to international peace. Soviet media, in turn, continue to hammer away against a full range of Peking policies.*

TASS reported the release of the crew and helicopter on the 27th as well as the crew's arrival in Moscow on the 29th. The initial TASS report, also broadcast on domestic radio the same day and carried in Moscow papers on the 28th, seemed designed to give the Chinese a minimum of credit for the gesture. It repeated the Soviet version of the incident, noting that the helicopter was "illegally apprehended" in March 1974, and that the Soviet government had since "demanded many times" the return of the "illegally detained" crew. No comment from Soviet officials or the media on the crew's release has yet been heard. Moscow's East European allies have generally shown the same reticence so far. Budapest radio's Moscow correspondent, however, reported that the Chinese gesture "will undoubtedly relax the tense Soviet-Chinese relations" although "fundamental differences" in views remain.

It remains to be seen whether some reciprocal gesture will be forthcoming from Moscow. Although it was revealed belatedly in a March 1972 Brezhnev speech, in January 1971, on the eve of the last Congress, the Soviet representative to the border talks in Peking tabled a proposal for nonuse of force in relations between the two countries.

BACKGROUND Peking in the past has occasionally released foreign personnel detained in China for "spying" as a gesture of good will, notably toward the United States. In such instances, however, there had been no special treatment such as the dinner for the Soviet crew, nor have the Chinese reversed past

* During a domestic radio program devoted to foreign affairs on 24 October, TASS Director General Zamyatin said Peking was actually opening a "new phase" in its struggle against the Soviet Union. This charge was in response to unnamed persons who had "recently" suggested that Peking favored the normalization of "interstate relations" between the two countries.

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official PRC charges that the foreigners were spies. For example, on 13 December 1971--two months before former President Nixon's visit to China--NCNA reported that Peking had decided to reduce the sentences of Americans John Downey and Richard Fecteau, but the report continued to refer to them as spies and also reviewed their "crimes" against China.

A release more comparable to the current move occurred on 1 August 1955 when NCNA announced the freeing of 11 U.S. airmen held in China since the capture of their plane on a "spy" mission in 1953. That release was designed to improve the atmosphere surrounding Sino-U.S. talks in Geneva, and Peking gave wide coverage to approving statements from world leaders, including one from President Eisenhower.

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PRC FOREIGN AFFAIRS

YEAR-END COMMENT DWELLS ON SOVIET "EXPANSION" AGAINST WEST

Peking's year-end review of foreign affairs was highlighted by a comprehensive 25 December PEOPLE'S DAILY article attributed to Jen Ku-ping, a signature that appears frequently over authoritative Chinese comment. The assessment of world developments is most notable for sharpened criticism of the policies of the Soviet Union, which is depicted as the "main" danger to international peace. The United States is still seen by Peking as strategically equal to the USSR, but as on the defensive in the face of a surging "offensive strategy" by the USSR. As in last year's comment, which was also capped by a Jen Ku-ping PEOPLE'S DAILY ARTICLE, a Soviet threat to China is muted while Europe is portrayed as the target of Soviet ambitions.*

The current Jen Ku-ping commentary flatly called the USSR "the most dangerous source of war," in contrast to his review of 1974 which labeled both superpowers as a potential source of world war. This year's commentary also departed from last year's more even-handed critique of the policies of both the USSR and the United States to scathingly denounce Moscow's strategy while softpedaling past charges against Washington. This pattern was followed in several late December NCNA reviews of 1975 developments which muffled last year's criticism of U.S. actions in East Asia, Africa, Cyprus and other areas and vividly portrayed the USSR as the primary danger to peace in all regions, even in such unlikely places as the Caribbean and South America.

Assessing the U.S.-Soviet balance of power in specific areas, the PEOPLE'S DAILY article broke new ground in claiming U.S. "superiority" in the Middle East and in demonstrating Chinese optimism over Asian resolve to resist any expansion of Soviet influence. Contrasting with Peking's shrill warnings earlier this year over the "danger" posed by Soviet expansion in Asia as the United States withdrew following its Indochina defeats, the article praised Asian countries' firm resistance to Moscow's efforts to extend its influence under the cloak of the Asian collective security proposal.

* For a discussion of the year-end comment last year, see the TRENDS of 15 January, pages 17 & 18.

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The bulk of the article focused on the "intensified" superpower arms race and their rivalry in Europe, stressing China's longstanding arguments against Soviet detente policies. Specifically ridiculing the Helsinki summit accord on European security signed this August and the November 1974 U.S.-Soviet Vladivostok accord on strategic arms, the article highlighted the alleged futility of attempting to limit Soviet ambitions with such "scrap paper." It observed that despite past disarmament agreements, the USSR has virtually closed the "gap" in the nuclear arms race with the United States and is in "the superior position" in the field of conventional arms. It took unusual pains to detail Soviet designs on Europe, noting that three quarters of Soviet forces are deployed there and that the Soviets are presently "baring their fangs and showing their claws," bringing about a "sabre-rattling and tense situation" along the western front.

Jen Ku-ping repeated his contention of last year that the superpowers are "inwardly weak" even though they possess great strategic strength, attempting thereby to once again encourage greater world resistance and military preparedness against the superpowers, particularly the USSR. He routinely reviewed U.S. economic problems, and made a rare reference to discord within the U.S. leadership, stating that "disputes within the ruling clique are incessant." The PEOPLE'S DAILY article gave more attention than last year to Soviet internal problems, playing up the recent crop failures and lowered economic goals as an indication of "the feeble nature of social imperialism." As in last year's comment, the article admonished that unchecked superpower policies will surely lead to world war, but left open the possibility that popular resistance in the form of military preparations and "revolution" can prevent the holocaust and defeat the superpowers.

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ANGOLA

USSR REJECTS U.S. CRITICISM OF SOVIET AID TO POPULAR MOVEMENT

The most forceful Soviet response to date to Administration complaints about Soviet actions in Angola came in a 26 December IZVESTIYA article, by A. Klimov, which warned that the Angola situation "constitutes a considerable danger which exceeds regional limits." Although the article did not mention Secretary of State Kissinger's 23 December news conference, it seemed clearly to respond to his argument that Soviet military involvement in Angola, which was what prompted U.S. assistance there, is inimical to detente. Moscow media have only briefly reported the Secretary's news conference, citing his affirmation to continue U.S. assistance to factions in the Angola war.*

Clearly answering recent statements by Kissinger and the President, the IZVESTIYA article criticized "some of the leaders of the United States" and other countries who are "attempting to exert pressure on the Soviet Union, are shifting onto it the responsibility for the emergence of the conflict and are accusing the USSR of disrupting the 'balance of forces' in Southern Africa and of pursuing a policy which 'contradicts' the detente process." Rejecting this view, the article stated that the Soviet Union had given "political, moral, and material support" to armed struggles in Africa for years and that its continued support for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was "quite natural." An even stronger affirmation of Soviet determination was made later in a passage rejecting the view of "Maoists" that detente would cause Moscow to withhold support from popular struggles. The article asserted flatly that "the USSR is not leaving the People's Republic of Angola (PRA) in the lurch, no matter who has insisted on this or how and on what pretexts they have insisted."

Dealing with the upcoming Organization of African Unity (OAU) meetings on the Angola question, the IZVESTIYA article attempted to dismiss the issue of Soviet involvement in Angola and call upon

* Earlier statements on Angola by President Ford--on 19 and 20 December--had also received circumspect Soviet treatment. Moscow reported that the President had made "unfriendly" remarks about Soviet policy in Angola, but did not identify him directly when rejecting charges of Soviet intervention by "certain U.S. political circles." See the TRENDS of 24 December 1975, pages 1-2, for a discussion of the earlier Soviet comment.

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the Africans to focus on the intervention of South Africa against the MPLA. Thus, the author warned African states not to join Western countries in a campaign of anticommunism or anti-Sovietism. He maintained that the PRA has followed a nonaligned policy, and-- in effect echoing Secretary Kissinger's remarks on U.S. willingness to accept Marxists factions in Africa--he noted that "the imperialists have been reconciled" to other governments in Africa with policies similar to the PRA's.

The article also argued that the OAU should not attempt to bring about the amalgamation of the MPLA with the two rival Angolan movements, maintaining that there can be "unity with national forces" but not with "those who have entered upon a criminal alliance with the bitterest enemies of Angola's national interests." According to the author, the essential question facing the OAU is whether to "reaffirm the line of intensifying the struggle to eliminate the racist regime in South Africa or whether to embark on a 'detente in relations' with this regime."

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U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

JOURNAL NOTES IMPACT OF INFLATION ON U.S. DEFENSE SPENDING

A study of current trends in the U.S. defense posture in the December issue of the journal USA cites figures which show that, measured in constant dollars, the U.S. defense budget has not grown since the early 1960's. Previous extensive Soviet comment on U.S. defense spending has consistently stressed the steady increases in spending totals while ignoring the impact of inflation.

The article by Georgiy Svyatov, head of a section in the USA Institute, reproduces tables derived from Western studies such as the annual Defense Department posture statement and the Brookings' Institute series on "Setting National Priorities" to support the author's observation that real defense spending dropped 30 percent from 1968 to 1976. Measuring current spending against a year when the U.S. Indochina involvement had not yet distorted the comparison, he concludes that in terms of "real purchasing power" defense spending in the United States this year will approximately equal that in 1964. He goes on to calculate that defense spending as a percent of GNP declined from 9.5 percent in 1968 to 5.8 percent in 1976. Svyatov observes that these changes in the structure of the U.S. defense effort have coincided with the adoption of a "more realistic approach" by the United States and the replacement of the goal of strategic superiority with the concepts of "sufficiency" and "essential equivalence."

Svyatov is not totally happy about trends in the U.S. military effort. He notes that spending is now scheduled to rise two to three percent yearly for the rest of the decade. Moreover, through qualitative improvements and enhanced cost effectiveness, the United States will be able, he says, to increase the number of deliverable warheads to 10,000 by 1980 and 15,000 by the mid-1980's, even while spending less in this area than in the early 1960's. He even complains that the "growing military potential" of the United States complicates the process of realizing a stable peace.

Nevertheless, his discussion of the trend in U.S. defense spending over the last 10 years tends to undermine the image of a rapidly growing U.S. military effort evoked by routine Soviet commentary.

Most comment in Soviet media on the progress of the current year's defense budget through the Congress has attempted to play down the significance of the reductions made in both houses. A 21 December

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IZVESTIYA dispatch by that paper's Washington correspondent, however, described a "fierce struggle" over the defense budget on Capitol Hill this year and concluded that the finally agreed reduction currently forecast to be \$7.4 billion would represent a "substantial restriction on Administration demands." The correspondent added that "a limit, albeit temporary, has been put on the uncontrollable appetite of the American military."

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USSR - TURKEY

AGREEMENT TO CONCLUDE "POLITICAL DOCUMENT" MARKS KOSYGIN VISIT

Premier Kosygin's 26-29 December official visit to Turkey to attend the inauguration of the Iskenderun metallurgical works produced an agreement between the two countries to draw up a "political document on friendly relations and cooperation." According to the communique, the document will be signed "in the near future" at a high-level meeting. While TASS' summary of the communique highlighted the agreement on a political document, Moscow has otherwise been silent thus far and has even appeared to go out of its way to avoid mentioning the subject.

Agreeing to disagree on the procedure for solving the Cyprus problem, the sides merely called in the communique for settlement of the question through negotiations, in keeping with the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and nonalignment of Cyprus, and insuring "full security" for both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

NEW DOCUMENT Turkish Premier Demirel had foreshadowed the announcement on a political document in remarks in his banquet speech on the 26th. Recalling the Soviet-Turkish "Declaration of Principles of Good-Neighborly Relations" issued at the conclusion of Podgorny's visit in April 1972, Demirel went on to express Turkey's readiness "to prepare jointly--as much as possible--new documents, in the near future, determining some other aspects of our relations" in order to make them "even more harmonious." Demirel added that "we believe that our good-neighborly relations should be called friendly cooperation relations," which would "reflect the realities in a more correct light."

Reducing Demirel's remarks to bland generalities, TASS' account ignored the reference to new documents and reported him merely as saying that Soviet-Turkish good-neighborly relations should more appropriately be termed relations of "friendly cooperation." Similarly, in the first followup comment on the visit, a Vladimir Shmarov commentary on Moscow's domestic service on the 30th avoided mention of the proposed document, noting only that "experience" and "goodwill on both sides" had opened the way to elevating relations to a "new and higher stage." A 30 December TASS roundup of foreign press comment on the visit also sidestepped the issue of a new document, reporting that Turkish press reaction focused on the development of good-neighborly relations. TASS did cite AP as reporting that the Soviet Union and Turkey were

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"exploring fresh avenues for the establishment of closer political relations" at a time when Turkey was "revising" its relations with the West.

Background: At the time of Podgornyy's April 1972 visit to Turkey, when the declaration of good-neighborly relations was signed, Turkish press reports indicated that Moscow had proposed to Ankara the conclusion of a friendship and cooperation treaty to replace the 1921 friendship pact.* Moscow for some time has marked the 1921 treaties--with neighbors Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan--in anniversary comment. While available Turkish media coverage of Kosygin's visit made no mention of any new Soviet approach in this regard, IZVESTIYA on the 27th did recall the 1921 treaty as well as the 1972 declaration. In a dispatch pegged to Kosygin's visit, IZVESTIYA special correspondent Deynichenko remarked that the principles of equality and mutual trust embodied in the 1921 treaty had "stood the test of time" and were reflected in "various forms of business cooperation" at present.

At least twice this fall Soviet media took note--without comment--of Turkish press expressions of interest in a Soviet-Turkish non-aggression pact. A Turkish-language broadcast in late September cited articles in MILLIYET along this line, and an IZVESTIYA report on 22 October on the results of the Turkish elections pointed to a BARIS article calling "above all for 'a nonaggression pact to be signed with Turkey's big neighbor--the Soviet Union.'"

CYPRUS PROBLEM The communique indicated that the two sides stood firm on their differences over Cyprus in noting that they had "exchanged and expressed their views" on the question. The sides' reference to settling the problem by "peaceful means and negotiations" merely served to underscore the contradiction between Ankara's insistence on intercommunal talks and Moscow's August 1974 proposal for an international conference. Demirel in his banquet speech on the 26th made clear Ankara's opposition to "Greek Cypriot" efforts to internationalize the question, and Kosygin in his reply speech refrained from raising the Soviet proposal. He merely repeated the standard Soviet pledge of support for the "sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity" of Cyprus and reiterated that the two communities must be allowed to solve their internal affairs without outside interference. As if to assuage Greek concerns regarding the visit, TAS3 on the 29th replayed comment from the Greek Cypriot communist organ KHARAVYI stressing that the visit was aimed at improving "bilateral relations" in the spirit of Helsinki and that the Soviet stand on Cyprus had "remained 'firm and unchanged.'"

* Podgornyy's 1972 visit and the declaration on relations are discussed in the TRENDS of 19 April 1972, pages 34-38.

CHINA-EAST TIMOR

PRC BACKS EAST TIMOR GOVERNMENT, RECEIVES DEFENSE MINISTER

In a major move in its increasing opposition to Indonesian efforts to annex East Timor, the PRC has welcomed a visiting delegation from the newly-founded Democratic Republic of East Timor. Peking has yet to announce its formal recognition of the republic; however recognition--and, perhaps, military assistance--may result from the visit of the delegation, led by Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief Rogerio Tiago de Fatima Lobato.

Lobato was greeted on arrival on 29 December by PRC Vice Foreign Minister Han Nien-lung and had talks later that day with Han and other Chinese officials, including Yin Chen-tao, deputy director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Defense. At a banquet that night speeches were delivered by PRC Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua and Lobato; and on the following day PRC Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff Ho Chen-wen hosted a banquet for Lobato which was said to have been held in a "warm atmosphere of friendship."

In his banquet speech, Chiao Kuan-hua for the first time expressed Chinese Government support for the cause of the Revolutionary Movement for the Independence of East Timor (FRETILIN). He extended "warm congratulations" to Lobato on the establishment of the East Timor republic and stated that "the Chinese Government and people sternly condemn the Indonesian Government" for its "act of aggression" against the new East Timor government. Chiao reiterated the demand--previously made only in the name of the Chinese people--that the Indonesian Government withdraw its forces and cease interference in East Timor, and he asserted that the "Chinese Government and people firmly support" the "just struggle" of the people of East Timor and are confident that it will succeed following protracted armed struggle.

China's initial cautious coverage of events in East Timor last fall and its reaction to the formation of the FRETILIN government on 28 November had suggested that Peking hoped to maintain the conciliatory attitude toward Indonesia of recent years.* Low-level Chinese comment had noted only that the new government "reflected

* Previous Peking comment on East Timor is discussed in the TRENDS of 16 October 1975, page 30; 3 December 1975, page 25; and 10 December 1975, pages 10-11.

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the aspirations" of the East Timor people and had expressed the "hope" that Indonesia would refrain from "armed intervention."

Indonesia's 7 December invasion of East Timor had prompted a 9 December PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article which had condemned the Indonesian action, but only in the name of the "Chinese people," and had offered Peking's first explicit and authoritative support for "just" armed struggle of the East Timor "people." Peking had also reported on 17 December PRC United Nations representative Huang Hua's remarks at the United Nations Security Council debate on East Timor, in which Huang had praised the FRETILIN government as reflecting the East Timor people's aspirations for independence and had denounced Indonesia's "naked aggression" as part of a "long-premeditated scheme of annexing East Timor."

On 21 December Peking had replayed an 8 December statement by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) Central Committee "delegation" resident in Peking, the first such report of a PKI statement by Peking since a heavily censored NCNA report on 24 May 1975 of the PKI's 55 anniversary statement. In reporting the statement NCNA followed its usual practice of substituting the original statement's references to the "Suharto fascist clique" with "Indonesian Government," and it excised the original statement's contention that Indonesian actions were being directed by the United States.

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COMMUNIST RELATIONS

ITALIAN ARTICLES DISCUSS SOVIET VIEWS ON CP STRATEGY

The latest in a series of informed Western commentaries on the doctrinal controversy over communist party strategy that has agitated the communist world since last summer were an interview in the 7 December issue of the Italian leftist weekly L'ESPRESSO and an unsigned report in the 9 December issue of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) daily L'UNITA. Both attest to the accuracy of speculation that the current controversy reflects deep disagreements among communist parties over questions both of strategy and authority. The major West European parties appear to believe that "socialism" is not incompatible with true democracy; Moscow pays lip service to this belief but stresses the need for measures, such as the "dictatorship of the proletariat," which reflect an older and harsher conviction.

L'ESPRESSO INTERVIEW The L'ESPRESSO interview was conducted with former PRAVDA editor A.M. Romyantsev, long a storm center of controversy for his liberal-leaning views and now, apparently, facing the possible loss of his Central Committee membership as a result of his failure to be reelected to the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences last month. Nevertheless, he was introduced in the interview, inaccurately, as a "deputy chairman of the Academy of Sciences" and, accurately, if somewhat imprecisely, as "one of the great deacons of the CPSU." The interviewer was Gianni Corbi, editorial director of the journal, and long noted for his interest in communist issues.

Corbi posed two questions to Romyantsev, editorializing expansively both in defining the questions and in describing Romyantsev's answers. The first question concerned the controversy between the PCI and the CPSU over the issue of whether there should be a general strategy (presumably defined by Moscow) for the communist movement or whether each communist party should adapt its strategy to the local circumstances. In posing the question, Corbi specifically ascribed the first viewpoint to the Zarodov article in the 6 August PRAVDA and the second to the PCI response to the Zarodov article, reported in the 12 August L'UNITA.

In his answer, Romyantsev took care to insist that he could speak only as a "Soviet scholar," but he seemed to belie his modesty by the unequivocal directness of his response. He said that despite any variations in strategy that might be justified by changing

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times or differing circumstances the one basic principle that communist parties have in common is the "dictatorship of the proletariat." This, he said, is the "ultimate aim of our joint struggle." In commenting on Rumyantsev's answer, Corbi warned against minimizing the significance of his bluntness, wondering whether it might not be intended as a "message" or a "warning" to the PCI leaders.

The second question posed by Corbi was whether the differing views expressed by Soviet theorists on the crisis of capitalism reflected "profound divergences" among the Soviet leaders. To explain the first part of his question, Corbi asserted that some Soviet theorists, such as Timur Timofeyev, head of the Institute of the International Workers Movement, judge the crisis to be "structural and irreversible," and others, such as Nikolay Inozemtsev, head of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, consider it "less grave and transitory."

In answering the question, Rumyantsev distinguished between what he called the "global" crisis of capitalism, which he termed "insuperable," and "cyclical" crises, which he termed "superable and transitory." Rumyantsev implied that the impression of differences among Soviet theorists was mistaken, that Western observers were simply confused about the issues.

L'UNITA REPORT The L'UNITA report presented an interpretation of the renewed Soviet public discussion of issues of CP strategy and some critical comments on two recent examples of the discussion. Regarding the discussion as a whole, L'UNITA sought to play down its authoritative aspects and to present it as primarily an academic debate. It argued that the "different levels of theoretical quality" of the articles and the "differences of emphasis and content" support this interpretation.

L'UNITA then went on to cite Vladim Zagladin's article in THE WORKING CLASS AND THE MODERN WORLD (No. 5, 1975) and Stepan Salichev's article in KOMMUNIST (No. 17, 1975) as examples of the debate. Although the PCI daily described the contents of both in seemingly detached terms, it took issue with certain implications in each which it believed ran counter to PCI stands. It seems apparent that L'UNITA chose these Soviet articles for comment either because the PCI regarded them as implicitly critical of itself or because they had been so interpreted by other observers. In any event, L'UNITA took the occasion of rebutting the objectionable portions of the Soviet articles to strongly reiterate the PCI's commitment to the compatibility of democracy and "socialism."

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VIETNAM

NORTH AND SOUTH CONTINUE PROGRESS TOWARD CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

The governmental unification process continued in Vietnam last week with reviews and ratification of the work done at the November North-South consultative conference in Saigon.* A "Conference of Representatives of the South Vietnamese People," held in Saigon from 20 to 22 December, and the second session of the DRV National Assembly, meeting from the 22d to the 27 in Hanoi, were essentially reruns of the November conference, imparting the same impression of a well-staged propaganda event. NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho keynoted the Saigon conference with a rehash of the November decisions, and National Assembly Standing Committee Chairman Truong Chinh read a report on the November conference to the Assembly session that similarly broke no new ground.

In his speech at the closing session of the Saigon conference, Pham Hung, VWP Politburo member and Secretary of the VWP in the South, did sound a cautionary note when he warned that the reunification process is a "very complex" and "difficult task" which must be carried out on the basis of "investigation" and "study" of the "actual situation." Throughout his speech--transmitted in full by Saigon radio on 22 December--Pham Hung stressed the need for "practical guidelines" and to keep in "close touch with reality." Although not specifying the "difficulties" which are "adversely influencing the general situation" in the South, he said that an "effort" must be made to "insure that the elections will be held "on schedule." The latest round of speeches on reunification have shed no new light on the prospective timetable to be followed for the elections other than to reiterate Truong Chinh's November assertion that the voting would take place in the first half of 1976.

Truong Chinh's latest Assembly remarks revealed that the North had taken the lead in organizing official deliberations on reunification. Media treatment of the events leading up to the November conference--in an apparent attempt to further highlight the role of the South--had noted that a meeting preparatory for

* The November consultative conference is discussed in the TRENDS of 19 November 1975, pages 17-19, and 26 November 1975, pages 11-12, respectively.

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the consultative conference was held in the South on 5 and 6 November but failed to say when the counterpart meeting in the North was held.* According to Truong Chinh, the DRV National Assembly Standing Committee held an "extraordinary session" on 27 October to "discuss, pass and plan" for the "achievement of national reunification." Moreover, he characterized the southern meeting as merely "discussing" the "policy of reunification."

* The meetings in North and South Vietnam to prepare for the consultative conference are discussed in FBIS SPECIAL REPORT "Reunification of Vietnam: Communists Move to create Single Central Government," No. 312, 14 November 1975.

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CHINA

NEW YEAR'S EDITORIAL FOCUSES ON UNITY, IDEOLOGICAL STUDY

For the fourth consecutive year, the New Year's Day joint editorial in PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG, and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY, carried by NCNA on 31 December, has focused on domestic affairs. Developing the thesis that all cadres should adopt a "correct" attitude on the "new things" of the cultural revolution, this year's editorial is highlighted by a new instruction from Chairman Mao Tse-tung apparently aimed at underlining the need to continue the class struggle within a framework of unity and stability. The editorial revealed that Mao "recently" declared that "'stability and unity do not mean writing off class struggle; class struggle is the key link and everything else hinges on it.'" The need for cadres to pay sufficient attention to ideological study was also indicated in the republication of two Mao poems, written in 1965, to mark the start of the new year which reaffirmed the ideological value of continuing class struggle in all areas of Chinese society. The editorial characterized the republication of the two poems--entitled "Chingkangshan Revisited" and "Two Birds"--as an event of "great political and immediate significance" and a "great inspiration" to people throughout the country.

The need for cadres to keep mass campaigns under tight party control was most clearly expressed in the editorial's reference to the ongoing national attack on critics of cultural revolutionary educational reforms, a campaign which the editorial termed "the recent farrago on the educational front."* The editorial noted the need to continue the campaign against the "handful of hostile people" who attempt "to strangle new things" but it was careful to note that the educational campaign should be carried out under the leadership of party committees and that "no 'fighting groups' should be organized." Major issues of "right and wrong" must be settled through "debate so as to achieve clarity in ideology." The editorial adopted a relaxed stance on errant cadres, noting that they should be taught to learn from their past mistakes in keeping with the formula of "unity-criticism and self-criticism-unity."

In reviewing the major domestic events of 1975, the editorial credited the campaign to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius, the movement to study the dictatorship of the proletariat and the

* For a discussion of the beginning of the current controversy over educational policy, see the TRENDS of 10 December 1975, pages 14-18.

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criticism of the classical novel "Water Margin" with invigorating the party and helping to increase production. For the second successive year, the New Year's editorial gave no overall annual figure for agricultural or industrial production; the 1973 editorial had claimed an over eight percent combined increase in industrial and agricultural output over 1972. This year's editorial did note, however, that the target for gross industrial and agricultural output set in the fourth five-year plan, which has now come to an end, has been "successfully met" and that efforts should be made to "fulfil and over fulfil" the goals of the first year of the fifth five-year plan which begins in 1976.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS Turning briefly to foreign affairs, the New Year's editorial, like the two previous ones, differentiated between the two superpowers by listing the Soviet Union ahead of the United States. Paying most attention to the Soviet Union, the editorial specifically charged that Moscow is "most energetically playing the fraudulent game of 'detente'" and that it represents the "most dangerous source of war today." The editorial routinely applauded the people of the Third World for playing their role as "the main force" in the struggle against the superpowers and it reiterated Peking's standard resolve to liberate Taiwan, our "sacred territory."

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YUGOSLAVIA

BELGRADE DEFENDS TIGHTENED CONTROLS ON IMPORTS FROM WEST

In the wake of several multi-billion dollar commercial packages with the Soviet Union and other CEMA members, Belgrade has become increasingly vocal in blaming the Western countries for its growing trade deficit with them, defending its own import restrictions, and insisting that the West adopt remedial measures to equalize trade. Yugoslavia, a nonaligned socialist country with stronger economic links to the West than its neighbors in Eastern Europe, has been affected adversely by the rise in world prices, the recession in the West, and the European Community's (EC) import restrictions. The current presentation of its trade predicament has been couched in relatively polite terms, suggesting a concern by Belgrade to avoid closing the door to the possibility of improving trade with the West under more favorable terms.

Tito set the tone for the new campaign in a speech to an LCY Presidium session on 11 December. Acknowledging that Belgrade's tightened import controls would displease some Western countries, he maintained that they would be understanding "when we show them our negative trade balance with them." This imbalance, he added, would cause serious difficulties to Yugoslavia in the future. Tito explicitly tied imports to exports, asserting that trade with the EC must be "more equal" and noting that if it "causes us some difficulties, we must not be slow in our reorientation to other markets." In this regard he spoke warmly of Yugoslavia's growing economic relations with the socialist and the nonaligned countries. Tito voiced satisfaction that Yugoslav trade was not oriented "only in one direction"--the West--but was growing with the East European countries on the basis of mutual interest. In addition to the Soviet Union, he singled out "neighboring Romania," declaring that Yugoslavia and Romania were aiming at doubling their volume of reciprocal trade.*

A TANJUG commentary on 21 December followed Tito's lead. Dismissing alleged Western reports predicting the "closing of the Yugoslav economy," the TANJUG item instead pointed to the "closing of the economies of the most developed countries" as the main reason for

* Moscow reported Tito's remarks, particularly those stressing Belgrade's good and improving ties to the bloc, in the 16 December PRAVDA. The report characteristically omitted, however, Tito's reference to stepped-up trade with Romania.

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a slowdown in trade not only between Europe and Yugoslavia but also between Europe and the less developed countries. It pinned responsibility for the "standstill" on Western "barriers" to Yugoslav exports. The commentary also expressed dissatisfaction with an inadequate increase of imports from the bloc, singling out raw materials and modern installations as areas for improvement.

A more strident tone was taken in an "official communique" issued by the Federal Executive Council (council of ministers) and carried by TANJUG on 25 December. The communique contended that Yugoslavia's import controls were applied "on a strictly nondiscriminatory basis" and refuted "certain tendentious and incorrect assertions abroad and irresponsible statements by some individuals in Yugoslavia" that these controls were aimed at Western Europe. By contrast it hit the EC for "certain discriminatory measures directly affecting Yugoslav exports," blaming these and the world recession for Belgrade's deficit with the West. These measures and conditions could justify retaliatory acts, it observed, but Yugoslavia had refrained from taking such measures. The communique ended with the assertion that the Western countries "are rightly expected" to offset Belgrade's trade imbalance "by making possible larger imports from Yugoslavia."

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NOTES

ARGENTINE COUP ATTEMPT: Moscow, which has been taking a cautious, wait-and-see attitude toward Argentina's deteriorating political situation, has condemned the action of Argentine air force officers in attempting the 18 December abortive coup, calling it a "mutiny" by "fascist desperadoes." Participants in Moscow radio's 28 December roundtable program implicitly warned against a return to the military governments that ruled Argentina before Peronism's return to power in 1973. But the roundtable observers acknowledged that "there is quite a lot of discontent with the situation" in the country. Moscow earlier had followed the Argentine Communist Party (PCA) in backing the government of President Isabel Peron. In the past few months, however, Soviet media have held back in publicizing the PCA's shift to open criticism of the government and repeated calls for a coalition of military men and representatives from a broad spectrum of political parties. Following the coup attempt, however, TASS on 20 December highlighted a PCA statement calling for a "democratic coalition government made up of civilians and military men" as the "only guarantee of the continuity of a constitutional regime." Havana media, which in the past have replayed PCA criticisms of the government, have reported the abortive coup but are not known to have commented.

USSR ON SYRIAN COMMUNISTS: Moscow in an Arabic-language commentary on the 29th responded with disdain to Cairo press reports on the 26th that some 300 Syrian communists had recently been arrested, that the secretary general of the Syrian Communist Party had fled the country, and that the political alliance between the ruling Ba'th Party and the Communist Party had collapsed. The commentary, critical of "imperialist propaganda," was transparently directed against Egypt. It took the tack that "certain Cairo newspapers" (in fact, the three major dailies), in publishing an "unfounded report" on the arrests of "numerous" Syrian communists, had provided grist for the imperialist propaganda mill. Citing an unnamed Syrian spokesman, it stressed that the "rumors" about the arrests were a "fabrication from A to Z" and that the claims of the demise of the National Progressive Front were "also a complete lie." Moscow's lone comment ventured no explanation of Cairo's motivation other than implied political naivete in having helped "imperialist organizers" to launch an "anti-Syrian propaganda campaign" designed to disrupt Syrian political unity and weaken the "Arab front against Israeli aggression." Syrian media monitored to date have ignored the issue.

MOSCOW ON JAPANESE SEA-LIMIT: In an apparent effort to discourage Japanese hopes of any Soviet concessions on disputed issues during USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to Japan in early January, Moscow's media treatment of Japan continues to harden. Following up on a 17 December RED STAR article charging that "militarist circles" in Japan were attempting to interfere in Soviet-Japanese relations, a 24 December Moscow radio commentary beamed to Japan broke new ground on another issue, specifically warning for the first time that attempts to expand the limit of Japanese territorial waters from 3 to 12 miles has a "certain note of unfriendliness toward the Soviet Union." The commentary charged that "certain Japanese fishery circles" are trying to cut down on Soviet fishing on the "high seas" off Japan's northeast coast. Calling the Soviet-Japanese fishery agreement, signed in Tokyo in June 1975 and ratified by the Japanese Diet in October, an "important step" in eliminating "unnecessary friction" between Soviet and Japanese fishermen, the commentary indicated that "certain Japanese fishery circles" are not observing the agreement and seem intent on deliberately sabotaging it.

KIM IL-SONG APPEARANCES: Kim Il-song appears to have broken his custom, well established over the past several years, of attending all major functions for visiting heads of state. Kim inexplicably dropped from public view after he greeted President Manuel Pinto da Costa of Sao Tome and Principe at the Pyongyang airport on 25 December and then spoke at a banquet given in da Costa's honor later that same day. Kim failed to attend any other function during the remainder of the visit. Vice-president Kang Yang-uk spoke on Kim's behalf at a banquet da Costa gave in Kim's honor on the 28th and took Kim's place at the airport departure ceremonies the following day. Kim Song-ae, Kim's wife, was noted by KCNA as being present at both functions. The two countries signed an economic and technical aid agreement on the 29th, and a routine communique was issued the same day.

PRC PROVINCIAL LEADERSHIP: A 28 December Nanning broadcast on sending work teams to rural areas for agricultural work identified An Ping-sheng for the first time as Kwangsi's party chief, a post vacated last October when CCP Politburo member Wei Kuo-ching was transferred out of the province to become first party secretary in Kwangtung. An's promotion to the top party spot in Kwangsi, he had been the ranking provincial party secretary under Wei for several years, is part of at least a three-way shuffle of provincial party chiefs which appears designed to strengthen central party control and to combat provincialism. Wei's transfer out of Kwangsi had sent former Kwangtung party leader Chao Tzu-yang to Szechwan where he was just recently identified as first secretary, thus displacing, for the moment at least, Szechwan's former party chief Liu Hsing-yuan who has now slipped from public view.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 22 - 28 DECEMBER 1975

<u>Moscow (2549 items)</u>			<u>Peking (881 items)</u>		
First Cuban CP Congress	(15%)	6%	Sao Tome President Da Costa	(2%)	13%*
China	(5%)	6%	in PRC		
Angola	(2%)	5%	PRC Release of Taiwan KMT	(--)	5%
Kosygin in Turkey	(--)	4%	Personnel		
Hungarian Foreign Minister	(--)	3%	Kang Sheng Death	(3%)	3%
Puja in USSR			Japan	(2%)	3%
Jordanian Delegation in USSR	(--)	3%	USSR	(3%)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* This figure excludes brief reports on Da Costa's meeting with Mao Tse-tung.